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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
NORMAN E. BOOTH, #03-A-6438,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2014-0294.59
INDEX # 2014-570
ORI #NY016015J

-against-

TINA STANFORD, Chairwoman,
NYS Board of Parole,
Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Norman E. Booth, verified on July 11, 2014 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on July 24, 2014. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the February 2013 determination denying
him discretionary parole release. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on August 8,
2014 and has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer and Return, including in
camera materials, verified on September 22, 2014 and supported by the Letter
Memorandum of Hilary D. Rogers, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, dated September 22,
2014, as well as by the Affirmation of Terrence X. Tracy, Esq., Counsel, New York State
Board of Parole, dated September 22, 2014. The Court has also received and reviewed
petitioner’s Answer and Objection of the Point of Law, sworn to on October 11, 2014 and
filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on October 17, 2014.
On December 2, 2003 petitioner was sentenced in Schenectady County Court, after
a plea, to an indeterminate sentence of 8a to 25 years upon his conviction of the crime
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of Conspiracy 2°. After having been denied discretionary parole release on two prior
occasions1, petitioner reappeared before a Parole Board on February 5, 2013. Following
that reappearance petitioner was again denied discretionary parole release and directed
to be held for an additional 24 months. The parole denial determination reads as follows:
“AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THE PANEL
HAS DETERMINED THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME YOUR
RELEASE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF
SOCIETY AND WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS NATURE OF
THE CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW.
THE BOARD HAS CONSIDERED YOUR INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENT
INCLUDING DISCIPLINE AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION.
REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED
INCLUDING YOUR RISK TO SOCIETY, REHABILITATION EFFORTS
AND YOUR NEEDS FOR SUCCESSFUL RE-ENTRY INTO THE
COMMUNITY.
YOUR RELEASE PLANS HAVE ALSO BEEN
CONSIDERED. MORE COMPELLING, HOWEVER, IS THE CALLOUS
DISREGARD YOU EXHIBITED FOR THE LIFE OF THE VICTIM AND HIS
FAMILY WHEN YOU CONSPIRED TO CAUSE THE DEATH OF THE
VICTIM. THIS CRIME WAS A CONTINUATION AND SEVERE
ESCALATION OF A PATTERN OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT. SINCE YOUR
LAST BOARD APPEARANCE, YOU INCURRED A TIER II INFRACTION
FOR VIOLENT CONDUCT.
THE BOARD NOTES THE LETTER OF SUPPORT FROM YOUR FATHER
ADN [sic] LETTERS FROM TRANSITIONAL PROGRAMS. THE BOARD
ALSO NOTES YOUR WORK ASSIGNMENTS, PROGRAM COMPLETIONS,
WORK IN THE FACILITY INFIRMARY, AND YOUR MEDICAL
CONDITION.
ALL FACTORS CONSIDERED, YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS NOT
APPROPRIATE.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the February 2013
parole denial determination was received by the DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals Unit on
July 29, 2013. Although the Appeals Unit apparently failed to issue its findings and
1

Petitioner first appeared before a Parole Board for merit parole consideration. His initial regular
Parole Board appearance was in February of 2011.

2 of 11

[* 3]

recommendation within the four-month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c), a
belated decision on administrative appeal was, in fact, issued on or about March 20, 2014.
This proceeding ensued.
As a threshold matter respondent asserts in an Objection in Point of Law that
petitioner’s challenge to the underlying parole denial determination is time barred under
the four-month statute of limitations set forth in CPLR §217(1). In this regard it is alleged
in respondent’s answering papers (at page four of the Letter Memorandum of Hilary D.
Rogers, Esq., Assistant Attorney General) that “[t]he Appeals Unit mailed the
Administrative Appeal Decision Notice and Statement of Appeals Unit Findings &
Recommendation to Petitioner and his counsel on March 20, 2014.” This proceeding was
commenced on July 24, 2014 when the Petition was filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s
office. See CPLR §304(1). Respondent maintains that the four-month statute of
limitation set forth in CPLR §217(1) commenced running on March 20, 2014 when the
decision notice was mailed to petitioner. Accordingly, respondent argues, in effect, that
this proceeding was commenced four days after the statute of limitations period expired
and that dismissal is therefore required. For the reasons set forth below, however, the
Court disagrees.
“It is well settled that the Statute of Limitations period does not begin to run until
a petitioner receives notice of the final administrative determination, and not upon the
issuance thereof.” Warburton v. Department of Correctional Services, 251 AD2d 831,
832, quoting Biondo v. New York State Board of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834. See Jackson
v. Fischer, 67 AD3d 1207. The burden of proving the applicability of the affirmative
defense of statute of limitations rest upon the party asserting it, here the respondent. See
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Jackson v. Fischer, 67 AD3d 1207 and Brush v. Olivo, 81 AD2d 852.” In the case at bar
respondent makes no effort to demonstrate when petitioner or his attorney received the
belated determination on administrative appeal. Even if the statute of limitations
commenced running on the date the notice was mailed to petitioner and/or his attorney,
the only indication that the final Administrative Appeal Decision Notice was mailed on
March 20, 2014 is an unidentified handwritten notation on the notice document. No
affidavit of service with respect to the alleged mailing is included with respondent’s
papers. Under such circumstances the Court finds no basis to conclude that this
proceeding should be dismissed as time-barred.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
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Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268,
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
A portion of the petition is focused on the assertion that the parole denial
determination was improperly based solely on the nature of the crime underlying
petitioner’s incarceration, without adequate consideration of other relevant statutory
factors. A Parole Board, however, need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it
is required to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it
required to expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision. See Montane v.
Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d 903, Valentino v. Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and
Martin v. New York State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate
Division, Third Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination
“. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but
only whether the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination
that is supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that
it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
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institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the Inmate Status Report (February 2013
Reappearance Report) and transcript of petitioner’s February 5, 2013 Parole Board
appearance reveal that the Board had before it information with respect to the appropriate
statutory factors, including petitioner’s therapeutic/vocational programing records,
COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment Instrument, sentencing minutes, disciplinary record
and release plans/community support in addition to the circumstances of the crimes
underlying petitioner’s incarceration and his prior criminal record. The Court, moreover,
finds nothing in the hearing transcript to suggest that the Parole Board cut short
petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise prevented him from expressing
clear and complete responses to its inquiries. Indeed, before the February 5, 2013 Parole
Board appearance was concluded one of the

presiding commissioners inquired of

petitioner as follows: “Is there anything that I haven’t mentioned that you think would be
important for us to know?” Petitioner responded as follows: “Well, I’m trying to do my
best. I believe I’ve come a long way and learning things and doing things to better my life
and to be more responsible. I know right now as the way it stands, I would rather be a
productive member of society and I know that’s what I will be if I’m given the chance. This
is my first time upstate, as you see. As long as I’ve been in jail, I’ve been abiding by the
rules, I’ve been doing what I have to do of changing myself. I’ve never learned of selfinventory, of checking what I do wrong with myself until I’ve came to prison. Prison has
taught me a lot and I believe that the Department of Correctional Services have did a great
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deed in changing me and I believe if given the chance to be released, I will be - - the
Department of Correctional Services will be proud of the things I’ve accomplished in life.”
In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crime underlying petitioner’s
incarceration as well as his prior criminal record and prison disciplinary record. See Shark
v. New York State Division of Parole Chair, 110 AD3d 1134 lv denied 23 NY3d 933, Dalton
v. Evans, 84 AD3d 1664 and Ondrizek v. Dennison, 39 AD3d 1114.
Citing King v. New York State Division of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, aff’d 83 NY2d
788, petitioner specifically argues “ . . . that the seriousness of a crime is NOT to be
determining factor when the Board is considering an inmates parole. Further, the law is
even clearer that at a second or subsequent Parole Board interview, the Board may only
focus on the inmate’s institutional record, record of temporary release participation, and
release plans.” In King the Appellate Division, First Department, not only determined that
the Parole Board improperly considered matters not within its purview (penal policy with
respect to convicted murders) but also that the Parole Board failed “ . . . to consider and
fairly weigh all of the information available to them concerning petitioner that was relevant
under the statute, which clearly demonstrates his extraordinary rehabilitative
achievements and would appear to strongly militate in favor of granting parole.” Id at 433.
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The appellate-level court in King went on to note that the only statutory criterion
referenced by the Board in the parole denial determination was the seriousness of the
crime underlying Mr. King’s incarceration (felony murder of an off-duty police officer
during the robbery of a fast food restaurant). According to the Appellate Division, First
Department, “[s]ince . . . the Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se
should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances
beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself.” Id at 433.
In July of 2014 the Appellate Division, Third Department - whose precedent is
binding on this Court - effectively determined that the above-referenced “aggravating
circumstances” requirement enunciated by the First Department in King does not
represent the state of the law in the Third Department. See Hamilton v. New York State
Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268. In Hamilton it was noted that the Third Department
“ . . . has repeatedly held - both recently and historically - that, so long as the [Parole]
Board considers the factors enumerated in the statute [Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)] it
is ‘entitled . . . to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the] crime’ (Matter of
Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 203 (2014), lv granted 23 NY3d 903 (2014) [internal
quotation marks and citations omitted]’ . . .” Id at 1271 (other citations omitted). After
favorably citing nine Third Department cases decided between 1977 and 2014, the
Hamilton court ended the string of cites as follows: “ . . . but see Matter of King v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 434 (1993), aff’d on other grounds 83 NY2d
788[2 ] (1994) [a First Department case holding, in conflict with our precedent, that the

2

The Court of Appeals in King only referenced the fact that “ . . . one of the [Parole] Commissioners
considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical
treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the
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Board [of Parole] may not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of the
crime when the remaining statutory factors are considered only to be dismissed as not
outweighing the seriousness of the crime].” 119 AD3d 1268, 1272. The Hamilton court
continued as follows:
“Particularly relevant here, we have held that, even when a petitioner’s
institutional behavior and accomplishments are ‘exemplary,’ the Board may
place ‘particular emphasis’ on the violent nature or gravity of the crime in
denying parole, as long as the relevant statutory factors are considered
(Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 AD3d at 905). In so holding we
explained that, despite [the Valderrama] petitioner’s admirable educational
and vocational accomplishments and positive prison disciplinary history,
‘[o]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in
accordance with the requirements of the statutory guidelines is not subject
to further judicial review unless it is affected by irrationality bordering on
impropriety’ (id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). We
emphasize that this Court [Appellate Division, Third Department] has
repeatedly reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing
denials of parole to petitioners whom we recognized as having exemplary
records and as being compelling candidates for release.” 119 AD3d 1268,
1272 (additional citations omitted).
This Court therefore finds petitioner’s reliance on the decision of the Appellate Division,
First Department, in King to be misplaced.
Petitioner also argues that the Parole Board improperly evaluated his risk
assessment in that he was scored as a low risk for committing a new violent felony offense,
for rearrest and/or for absconding.

This Court notes, however, that

although the

Appellate Division, Third Department, has determined that a risk and needs assessment
instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in connection with post-September 30,
2011 parole release determinations (see Linares v. Evans, 112 AD3d 1056, Malerba v.

consequences to society if those sentences are not in place. Consideration of such factors is not authorized
by Executive Law §259-i.” 83 NY2d 788, 791. The Court of Appeals, however, did not address that aspect
of the Appellate Division, First Department, decision in King holding that a parole denial determination
must be based upon a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the
underlying crime.
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Evans, 109 AD3d 1067, lv denied 22 NY3d 858 and Garfield v. Evans, 108 AD3d 830),
there is nothing in such cases, or the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), to
suggest that the quantified risk assessment determined through utilization of the risk and
needs assessment instrument supercedes the independent discretionary authority of the
Parole Board to determine, based upon its consideration of the factors set forth in
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an inmate should be released to parole
supervision. The “risk and need principles” that must be incorporated pursuant to the
amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), while intended to measure the rehabilitation
of a prospective parolee as well as the likelihood that he/she would succeed under
community-based parole supervision, serve only to “ . . . assist members of the state board
of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
Executive Law §259-c(4)(emphasis added). Thus, while the Parole Board was required to
consider the COMPAS instrument when exercising its discretionary authority to determine
whether or not petitioner should be released from DOCCS custody to community-based
parole supervision, it was not bound by the quantified results of the COMPAS assessment
and was free to grant or deny parole based upon its independent assessment of the factors
set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) including, as here, the nature of the underlying
crime and prior criminal record. See Rivera v. New York State Division of Parole, 119
AD3d 1107 and Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896, aff’d 117 AD3d 1258, lv denied 24 NY3d
901.

Finally, although the Court shares petitioner’s concern with respect to the basis of
the COMPAS scoring of his “Prison Misconduct” at 8 (“High”), the Court finds nothing
in the record to suggest that such scoring was a factor in the February 2013 parole denial
determination. While petitioner’s May 2011 Tier II Disciplinary Hearing infraction
involving charges of violent conduct/fighting was referenced in the parole denial
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determination, the Inmate Status Report (February 2013 Reappearance Report)
specifically noted that such infraction was petitioner’s only disciplinary referral since his
prior Board appearance and that such infraction only resulted in a loss of privileges
disposition. During the course of the February 5, 2013 Parole Board interview, moreover,
it was specifically noted that petitioner had incurred no Tier III infractions since entering
DOCCS custody and the details of the incident underlying the May 2011 Tier II
determination were discussed at some length, with petitioner afforded full opportunity
to explain the circumstances of the incident. Based upon the foregoing, the Court
concludes that any possible error in the COMPAS numerical scoring of petitioner’s
“Prison Misconduct” record was harmless in view of the Board’s obvious familiarity with
petitioner’s disciplinary record.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

February 10, 2015 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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